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An Analytical Overview of Labour Market Reforms  




ABSTRACT: While there has been an increase in interest in employment pro-
tection, for example in the literature on labour market insiders and outsiders, there 
is a lack of cross-country comparative research on reforms of the employment 
protection legislation and the regulation of temporary work. This article provides 
such an overview for a wide set of countries including the EU-15 plus five Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slo-
vakia and Slovenia. It makes two contributions: first, it identifies a set of reform 
types.  One  major  reform  type,  two-tier  reform,  and  several  minor  types: 
deregulation  of  temporary  employment  in  countries  with  low  levels  of  job 
protection for regular work; reregulation in countries with high levels of tempo-
rary  employment;  reregulation  in  countries  with  low  regulation  of  temporary 
work; and across-the-board concurrent deregulation. Second, the article highlights 
the difference in regulation that exists between fixed-term contracts concluded 
inside and outside temporary work agencies (TWAs). In identifying reform types, 
and the difference in the regulation of fixed-term contracts inside and outside 
TWAs,  the  article  contributes  to  our  understanding  of  the  variation  in  labour 
market regulation and reform. In addition, the article points to different expla-
nations for the reforms, in particular the influence of EC directives. 
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In the 1970s, most European countries introduced or strengthened employment protection 
legislation (Emmenegger 2009). At nearly the same time, beginning in the mid-1970s Euro-
pean economies went into a protracted economic crisis which brought with it a sharp rise in 
unemployment. During the 1980s and 1990s, countries began to confront this problem by 
reforming the employment protection measures introduced in the previous decade. The article 
intends to shed light on the variation in labour market reform in Europe from the mid-1980s 
to the present by identifying major and minor reform types, by describing the difference in 
regulation  that  exists  between  fixed-term  contracts  inside  and  outside  temporary  work 
agencies (TWAs), and by analysing the regulatory and political context in which the reforms 
were made.  
  The article first seeks to map a set of reform types using the OECD index of employ-
ment protection legislation (see note 1 and 2). The aim is not to develop a typology, based on 
a specific theoretical framework. In addition, an analytical framework will be presented in 
which the regulatory and political context in which the labour market reforms were made is 
included and some tentative conclusions can be drawn about the variation in initial regulation 
leading to different types of reforms and the variation in reform pressure originating from 
domestic or EU policy arenas. 
  Most focus in the literature has been put on two-tier reforms, i.e. the combination of the 
deregulation  of  temporary  work  with  no  deregulation  of  the  employment  protection  for 
regular work; when both temporary and regular work are deregulated it is termed across-the-
board reforms (e.g. Saint-Paul et al. 1996; Ochel 2008).
1 The two-tier reform is the most 
common type of reform as we will see below, but it needs to be complemented by different 
and contrasting types of reforms which have also been present in the reform of European 
labour  markets.  Temporary  employment,  for  example,  has  not  been  deregulated  in  all 
countries. Low-regulation countries such as Ireland and UK in Western Europe, and most 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, have rather reregulated the employment protection 
for temporary workers on fixed-term contracts. This has also been the case in countries with 
very high levels of temporary employment such as Spain. There have also been instances of 
deregulation of temporary employment in low-regulation countries such as Italy, Belgium 
and Denmark, and instances of across-the-board reforms as in Slovakia.  
  Second, the article seeks to highlight the variation of regulation within temporary work. 
In the reform types described above the regulation of temporary work is used as an aggregate 
of both fixed-term contracts concluded inside and outside temporary work agencies (TWAs).
2 
The differences that exist between the regulation of fixed-term contracts inside and outside   3 
TWAs have not yet been systematically covered in the literature. The contribution here is 
two-fold. First, in describing the cases which serve to illustrate the reform types the dis-
tinction will be upheld between reforms relating to fixed-term contracts inside and outside 
TWAs. Second, the differences in regulation between fixed-term contracts inside and outside 
TWAs will be examined more in depth in a separate section using the Ecofin LABREF data-
base.
3 
  An  important aspect  with regard to the difference  in regulation between  fixed-term 
contracts inside and outside TWAs is the relevant EU legislation, especially the two EC 
directives on fixed-term work (1999/70/EC) and temporary agency work (2008/104/EC). It is 
interesting  to  note  that  the  first  explicitly  excludes  from  its  scope  fixed-term  contracts 
concluded within TWAs. These are then dealt with in the second directive, but the content of 
the regulation differs substantially.  
  In analysing different reform types in Europe taken as a whole, it is of course necessary 
to paint with broad brush strokes. Not all countries will be covered and not all reforms can be 
described in detail.
4 However, the ambition is to provide sufficient detail in order to make it 
possible to distinguish between reform types and thus to assist other researchers in their 
interpretation of the reforms. The first part uses the OECD EPL-indicators (see note 1 and 2) 
to illustrate the major reform trends in Western Europe, between coordinated market eco-
nomies/mixed  market  economies  (CMEs/MMEs),  liberal  market  economies  (LMEs),  and 
emerging market economies (EMEs) in Central and Eastern Europe.
5 The second part then 
identifies the major reform type (two-tier reforms) and introduces a number of additional 
minor  reform  types:  deregulation  of  temporary  employment  in  low-regulation  countries, 
reregulation in countries with already high levels of temporary employment, reregulation of 
temporary employment in low-regulation countries, and across-the-board concurrent deregu-
lation.  The  final  part  compares  the  regulation  of  fixed-term  contracts  inside  and  outside 
TWAs. 
 
1. Broad reform trends 
The overarching labour market reform trends in Western and Central and Eastern Europe will 
be outlined in this section. First, there is in Western Europe a clear trend of two-tier reforms. 
We  also  show  that  this  is  typical  for  coordinated  market  economies  (CMEs)  and  mixed 
market  economies (MMEs), the  Continental and  Nordic countries, but  not for  the liberal 
market economies (LMEs), Ireland and the UK (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and Gingerich   4 
2004).  Second,  there  is  in  the  emerging  market  economies  (EMEs),  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe (Hancké et al. 2007), a reform trend with a reregulation of the employment protection 
for temporary workers along with a slight deregulation of the employment protection for 
regular workers (Slovakia).  
 
Reforms in the West, reforms in the East 
The common view among economists of developments on Western European labour markets 
has been to regard two groups of countries, the Continental and Nordic countries, on the one 
hand, and the Anglo-Saxon countries on the other, as being situated on opposite sides in the 
trade-off between unemployment and inequality (e.g. Blau and Kahn 2002); the former group 
of countries suffering from high unemployment due to over-regulated labour markets. There 
is, however, no consensus concerning the effects of labour market regulation on aggregated 
unemployment  levels  (OECD  2004).  But  since  the  mid-1980s,  Western  European  labour 
markets have undergone significant reforms. A major part of those reforms has concerned the 
employment protection legislation. In this area, the employment protection for regular em-
ployment has remained more or less unchanged, whereas temporary work has to an important 
degree been deregulated. This trend of two-tier reforms has been followed in most of the 
CMEs/MMEs.  In  the  LMEs,  in  contrast,  there  has  rather  been  a  slight  reregulation  of 
employment protection (see figure 1).
6   
 
- Figure 1 about here - 
  
  A  set  of  different  political  explanations  for  two-tier  reforms  have  emerged  in  the 
literature. The first set of explanations put the focus on the vote-maximising strategies of 
political parties in general using a median-voter argument (Saint-Paul et al. 1996), or social-
democratic parties in particular using a core-constituency argument (Rueda 2005). Recently, 
an  alternative  explanation  has  been  proposed  which  takes  the  social  partners  prominent 
position in the reforms process, in the area of labour market policy, as a starting point and 
which links the two-tier reforms with the organisational interest of unions (Davidsson 2011; 
Davidsson and Emmenegger 2011).  
  In Central and Eastern Europe, we can see a trend which resembles that of the LMEs 
(see figure 2).
7 There has been a slight reregulation from low levels of initial regulation of 
temporary work and a slight deregulation of employment protection for regular workers. This 
is mainly due to the across-the-board reforms that were made in Slovakia (see below). Thus,   5 
low-regulation countries in respect of temporary work, both in LMEs and in Central and 
Eastern Europe, have seen a slight reregulation. As we will see below, this is mainly due to 
the transposition of the EC directive on fixed-term work.
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- Figure 2 about here -  
 
2. Reform types 
Having outlined the major trends in labour market policy reform, the second part seeks to 
capture the underlying variation by identifying a set of additional reform types (see table 1). 
The reforms will be described and contextualised for a smaller number of countries, for each 
identified type. The prevalence of the reform types can be seen in the table below. 
 
- Table 1 about here - 
 
  The first section discusses the typical two-tier reforms in Western Europe. In these 
countries,  the  employment  protection  for  regular  workers  has  remained  more  or  less 
unchanged whereas there has been a substantial deregulation of temporary work. We can see 
this type of reform in France, Germany, Sweden, Portugal, Greece and the Netherlands. The 
next section focuses on a similar development of deregulation of temporary work in countries 
where there is a low regulation of regular employment, as in Italy, Belgium and Denmark. 
This is surprising since we should expect that there was less need for temporary employment 
in these countries. It seems like the deregulation was driven by strong reform pressure created 
by high unemployment rates, especially among the young cohort. In the next two sections, we 
will look at countries where there has, in contrast, been a reregulation of employment pro-
tection for temporary workers. First, using Spain as an example we look reregulation as a 
response to very high levels of temporary employment. Second, we discuss the reregulation 
in Central and Eastern Europe which primarily was a response to the accession to the EU in 
2004 and the transposition of the EC directive on fixed-term work. Third, we will look at the 
across-the-board reform in Slovakia. This is explained by national political factors such as a 
radical government and weak unions. The last reform, deregulation of employment protection 
legislation for regular work, which can be seen in Austria and Finland, will not be covered 
apart from the information in table 1 above. 
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Typical reforms in the West: two-tier reforms 
The rise in unemployment in the 1970s did not abate but instead continued throughout the 
1980s leading policy makers to begin searching for more radical solutions. It was in this 
context that discussions began about the need for making labour markets more flexible. In 
most countries, the reforms that were introduced in the following decades, however, focused 
only on deregulating temporary work while keeping more or less unchanged the legislation 
on regular work. This type of reform was prevalent, as mentioned in the previous section, in 
the majority of Western European countries.  
  In France there was a large public debate about flexibility in 1984 as well as negotia-
tions between the social partners about labour market reform. After negotiations between the 
social partners had failed, the social-democratic government decided to legislate on the issue 
of fixed-term contracts (outside TWAs): limiting restrictions on use and extending duration to 
24  months  (otherwise  6/12  months)  with  administrative  authorisation.  The  conservative 
government that took over in 1986 went further deregulating the employment protection for 
both  regular  and  temporary  workers.  The  part  of  the  reform  that  concerned  fixed-term 
contracts removed all restrictions on use and went from one to two renewals, making it in 
practice  possible  to  conclude  such  contracts  for  24  months.  With  regard  to  regular 
employment, the deregulation entailed the abolishment of the administrative authorisation of 
dismissal, but it is important to note that this did not remove the employment protection for 
regular workers but rather transformed the existing administrative regulation into judicial 
regulation.
9 Thereafter, no major reforms were concluded except in 1990 when fixed-term 
contracts were reregulated: restrictions on use were reintroduced and maximum duration was 
shortened from 24 months to 18 months. The negotiations between the social partners, which 
began in 2008, made little progress both with regard to employment protection for regular 
and temporary workers (Cahuc and Zylberberg 2009). On the whole, the reforms in France 
have been focused on deregulating fixed-term contracts (Davidsson 2011; Davidsson and 
Emmenegger 2011).  
  In Sweden, the discussions about the need for increased labour market flexibility coin-
cided with the sharp rise in unemployment, an effect of the financial and economic crisis in 
the early 1990s. The major reforms have also here primarily concerned the regulation of 
temporary work. In 1993, TWAs were legalised. Concerning fixed-term contracts outside 
TWAs,  as  was  the  case  in  France,  the  social-democratic  government  stepped  in  after 
negotiations had failed between the social partners and introduced legislation in 1997. The   7 
reform entailed an increase in the maximum duration from 6 to 12 months (18 months for 
first-time hires), and made it possible for the first time for collective agreements at the firm-
level to derogate from legislation with regard to fixed-term contracts. The next major reform 
was  introduced  by  the  conservative  government  in  2006/07.  The  reform  extended  the 
maximum duration for fixed-term contracts to 24 months and removed all restrictions on use. 
In addition, as was the case in the 1990s, the issue of a deregulation of the employment 
protection for regular workers was discussed between the social partners in 2008, but no 
headway was made (Davidsson 2011; Davidsson and Emmenegger 2011). 
  In Germany, the major deregulation of temporary work took place in 1985, 1994, 1997, 
2002 and 2004 (see also Ebbinghaus and Eichorst 2006). The first deregulation efforts in 
1985 included the extension of the maximum duration for fixed-term contracts inside TWAs 
from three to six months. The reform in 1994 extended it to nine months. The regulation of 
TWAs was also loosened. In 1997, more renewals were allowed for fixed-term contracts 
outside TWAs. Renewals and duration was extended further for the long-term unemployed. 
In 2002, fixed-term contracts outside TWAs were made more flexible for older workers and 
the maximum duration for fixed-term contracts inside TWAs was extended to 24 months. In 
2004, fixed-term contracts outside TWAs were extended to four years for start-up companies. 
In 2000, there was a reregulation of temporary employment. In response to the EC directive, 
restrictions on use were introduced for the use of fixed-term contracts outside TWAs. 
  In Portugal, the deregulation of temporary employment was made in 1995, 2003 and 
2007. In 1995, the social partners agreed to wide-ranging reforms which included a liberali-
sation  of  TWAs and  an  extension  of the  maximum  duration for  fixed-term  contracts.  In 
response to the EC directive, duration was then reduced to three years in 2001. In 2003, the 
maximum duration was extended again for certain types of contracts to six years. The maxi-
mum duration for fixed-term contracts inside TWAs was extended in 2007 from 12 months to 
24  months.  While  the  employment  protection  legislation  for  regular  work  has  also  been 
deregulated during the period, Portugal still score the highest in Europe in this dimension and 
it is difficult, therefore, to describe the reform trend as a gradual across-the-board reform. 
  In Greece, the legalisation of TWAs takes place in 1998 and 2001 and the regulation 
was further liberalised in the 2003 reforms. Fixed-term contracts outside TWAs were allowed 
for hikes in demand in 1990 and was further liberalised in 2003.  
  In  Netherlands,  the major  reform  deregulating  temporary  employment was  made  in 
1999. The regulation on maximum duration of fixed-term contracts was lifted and TWAs   8 
were liberalised. In 2002, in response to the EC directive, maximum duration was cut again to 
three years. 
 
Deregulation of temporary work in countries with low-regulation of regular work 
This section looks at some counter-intuitive reforms. In three low-regulation countries in 
relation to employment protection for regular workers, there has also been a deregulation of 
temporary  work:  in  Denmark  1995,  Belgium  1997  and  Italy  1997  and  2001.  The  major 
justification for the reforms seems to have been the high levels of youth unemployment, 
focusing the reform of facilitating labour market entry. In Denmark, the reform concerned the 
legalisation of TWAs, in Belgium it concerned primarily the deregulation of the use of fixed-
term contracts, by decreasing restrictions on use and by allowing renewals, and in Italy it 
concerned both the legislation on fixed-term contracts and TWAs. Another important aspect 
is that the regulation on temporary work was relatively strict in relation to other Western 
European countries prior to the reforms.  
The  explanation  for  these  counter-intuitive  reforms  is  partly  a  question  of  reform 
pressure  and  partly  due  to  initial  regulation.  In  Denmark,  the  regulation  of  employment 
protection  is  flexible  since  no  legislation  was  introduced  in  the  1970s in  contrast  to  the 
development  in  most  other  European  countries  (Emmenegger  2009).  In  contrast,  hiring 
workers through temporary work agencies was highly restricted. In other words, this was the 
only area that a deregulation of employment protection could target. In Belgium, employment 
protection legislation regarding fixed-term contracts was comparatively much more strictly 
regulated than regular contracts (Ochel 2008). In both of these countries, the reason seems to 
have been increasing reform pressure in the form of high (youth) unemployment which was 
channelled towards existing areas of strong regulation. In Italy, there were political voices 
who wanted to deregulate the employment protection also for regular workers (Art. 18),
10 but 
the legislation was defended by the unions via mass strikes. In that sense, the Italian reforms 
are more akin to the two-tier reform type described in the previous section. Below follows a 
more detailed description of the Danish and Italian reforms. 
  In Denmark, the unemployment rate had continuously risen from 2 per cent in the early 
1970s to 12 per cent in 1994. In response, successive left-coalitions carried out a broad re-
form of labour market policy, in particular cuts in the duration of passive unemployment 
benefits and increased focus on activation (EIRR 1997a; Kvist 2003; Andersen and Svarer 
2007; Ochel 2008). The reduction of restrictions regarding temporary work agencies should 
be seen as part of these efforts to address the issue of high and persistent unemployment. The   9 
first reform took place already in 1990. More importantly, the reform in 1995 involved an 
increase in the scope of activities of temporary work agencies and their recognition by the 
social partners.   
  In Italy, there have been consistent high rates of unemployment oscillating between 9-
12 per cent and very high youth unemployment rates at around 30 per cent. Italy has also 
stood out in respect of their very low employment rates (OECD 2009). In response, there 
have been a larger number of reforms particularly focused on labour market entry. In 1987, a 
wider use of fixed-term contracts was made possible, but which were regulated by collective 
agreements in terms of restrictions of use and maximum allowed share in firms. The next 
reform, the so-called Treu reform in 1997, had its background in the 1993 pact with the social 
partners in which they had agreed to a deregulation of temporary work put under pressure 
from the economic crisis. The 1997 reform, introduced by the left-coalition, included the 
legalisation of temporary work agencies and easing of regulations of apprenticeships and an 
end  to  the  automatic  conversion  of  fixed-term  into  regular  contracts  at  the  end  of  their 
duration. From 1998, fixed-term contracts are also allowed in the public sector. In 2001, the 
EC Directive on fixed-term work was transposed into Italian law. It had two consequences. 
The restrictions on use were eased, but at the same time the maximum cumulated duration 
was limited to three years for fixed-term contracts. The Biagi reforms by the conservative 
coalition in 2003 extended the use of temporary work agencies and introduced new types of 
fixed-term contracts, including on-call contracts. 
  Below, the focus shifts from the deregulation of temporary work to two opposite reform 
types: reregulation in the context of high levels of temporary employment and in the context 
of initial low levels of regulation. 
 
Reregulation in countries with high levels of temporary employment 
While in most countries, as described above, the rise in unemployment led to a deregulation 
of temporary work, in Spain we can see the opposite trend of reregulation. While unemploy-
ment  was  rising,  the  sheer  amount  of  people  in  temporary  employment  created  a  strong 
pressure for the reregulation. This has also been described as a situation where the median 
voter can be found among those in non-standard forms of employment, i.e. temporary or part-
time employment (e.g. Ochel 2008). We should note that a reregulation, however, did not 
take place in the case of Greece which also had very high levels of temporary employment in 
the 1980s, or in Portugal and Poland in the 2000s apart from the transposition of the EC 
directive (see below).    10
  The first democratic governments in the late 1970s and early 1980s took over the strict 
employment  protection  legislation  from  the  Franco  dictatorship  with  the  exception  of 
overturning the ban on unions and giving them a significant position in the collective bar-
gaining  system  and  in  the  administration  of  dismissals.  The  strict  legislation  meant  that 
regular contracts at the time represented more than 90 per cent of all employment contracts 
(Bentolila et al.  2008). In 1984,  the  government introduced a  new contract, a temporary 
employment  promotion  contract  (contrato  temporal  de  fomento  del  empleo),  which  in 
practice removed most restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts. The maximum duration 
was expanded to three years, with a minimum limit of six months. In addition, the severance 
payments associated with fixed-term contracts were much lower than for regular contracts. 
The effect was dramatic. Temporary employment rose from 8 per cent in 1984 to 34 per cent 
in 1992 (OECD 2009).  
  In response, a series of reforms were introduced in the 1990s and 2000s that had the 
aim of limiting the use of fixed-term contracts. In 1992, the minimum duration was extended 
to one year. In 1993, the maximum duration of training contracts was reduced from three 
years to two years. In 1994, the temporary employment promotion contract was abolished 
except for certain categories of workers (e.g. the disabled). The remaining contract-types had 
restrictions on use. On the other hand, fixed-term contracts were allowed for three years for 
start-up firms and temporary work agencies were legalised. In 1997, the fixed-term contract 
for start-up firms was abolished and for some contracts restrictions on use were tightened: 
temporary contracts concluded to respond to production needs was reduced to six months 
(within twelve months). However, they could be extended to 18 months through collective 
bargaining. The number of training contracts should be set by collective bargaining (EIRR 
1997b). In 1999, equal pay was introduced for those employed by temporary work agencies. 
In 2001, restrictions on use were further tightened and provisions regarding equal pay and 
working conditions were introduced. In 2006, workers who had more than 24 months of 
employment in the same firm within a 30 month period became entitled to a regular contract. 
The  government  also  offered  a  three-year  annual  subsidy  of  EUR  800  for  all  temporary 
contracts converted into regular contracts (OECD 2009).  
  During this period, the promotion of regular employment also included the lowering of 
dismissal costs for regular contracts by extending the acceptable reasons for dismissals in 
1994 and by introducing in 1997 a new type of regular contract for vulnerable groups on the 
labour market, in particular the temporary employed, which have lower severance payments. 
As in the case of Portugal it is, however, difficult to argue that these reforms would add up to   11
a gradual across-the-board reform since the employment protection legislation for regular 
work still is substantial.  
 
The reregulation of temporary work in countries with low initial regulation 
From figures 1 and 2 above, it is clear that the regulation of temporary employment was 
much softer in the LMEs, Ireland and the UK, and in the EMEs, the Central and Eastern 
European countries. One could assume therefore, that it would generate a push towards re-
regulation. However, many of the reforms have been associated with the transposition of the 
EC directive (1999/70/EC) on fixed-term work (outside TWAs) into national law which took 
place in Ireland and the UK in 2003 and 2002 respectively and in the Central and Eastern 
European countries just prior to or upon accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004.
11 
Second, fixed-term contracts  inside  TWAs were  first regulated in  the early 2000s in  the 
EMEs, which shows up as a reregulation.
12 This section will focus on the development in the 
EMEs, illustrated by the case of Poland, which is an example of both of these two develop-
ments.  
  In the Polish Labour Code, which was put into place during the first years of transition, 
there were no limitations on the renewal of fixed-term contracts (outside TWAs).
13 In 1996 a 
restriction was introduced regarding the number of allowed renewals (Surdej 2004). The new 
provision stated that two renewals were allowed for fixed-term contracts, but that a third 
renewal automatically transformed it into a regular contract. The new wave of deregulation in 
the 2002 reforms then repealed this provision (Spieser 2009, 195). The transposition of the 
EC directive into national law reintroduced in 2004 the restrictions on renewals that was in 
place before the 2002 reforms, but included a list of exceptions (see table below). None-
theless,  Poland  is  the  only  country  which  does  not  have  legislation  on  the  maximum 
cumulated  duration  of  fixed-term  contracts  (outside  TWAs).  In  addition,  the  law  only 
regulates one type of fixed-term contracts and excludes contracts for trial periods and con-
tracts for specific work (Hajn 2005). In reference to the EC directive, however, the Polish 
Supreme Court has ruled that these contracts should not be excessive in length (Spieser 2009, 
195). Considering that they very high levels of temporary contracts in Poland did not de-
crease after 2004, it is questionable whether these rulings have had any real effects.  
  The EC directive (1999/70/EC) on fixed-term work puts its focus on two issues: the 
application of the principle of non-discrimination between fixed-term and regular work, and 
the prevention of abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term contracts. The European 
Parliament called for the Council to approve the agreement but remained critical, it “... re-  12
gretted to note that the agreement covers only successive employment relationships, that the rules 
designed  to  prevent  abuse  through  successive  fixed-term  contracts  contain  no  qualitative  or 
quantitative obligations, and that no provision is made for priority access to jobs created or for these 
workers to have access to appropriate vocational training.”
14 The lack of scope and force in the 
directive can be explained by it being based on a Framework Agreement which is by nature a 
compromise between the social partners. Furthermore, the provisions of the agreement them-
selves allow for flexibility in the transposition of the directive to national law. The provision 
on the prevention of abuse (clause 5), for example, allows countries to choose from three dif-
ferent measures: objective reasons justifying the renewal of fixed-term contracts, maximum 
cumulated duration, and fixed number of renewals. And, in relation to both provisions, the 
social partners should be involved in the transposition of the directive (1999/70/EC).  
  The flexibility of the EC directive helps explain the variation we can see in the regu-
lation of temporary work, especially in the EMEs. The focus will be put on the provision on 
the prevention of abuse since the provision on equal treatment is more dependent on the 
judgements of national courts. In the LMEs, both Ireland and the UK introduced maximum 
cumulated duration of fixed-term contracts. In the EMEs, the picture is more varied (see table 
2). All countries except Poland have introduced regulation with regard to maximum duration 
in the national legislation. However, in all countries the maximum duration can be exceeded 
for a number of defined types of contracts. In  addition, in Slovakia  and Slovenia  (as in 
Sweden  and  the  Netherlands)  collective  agreements  allow  for  the  derogation  of  national 
legislation. On the contrary, it is only Poland that has limited renewals. In Slovakia, as we 
will see below, the introduction of maximum cumulated duration coincided with a more pro-
found deregulation including for example the lifting of the limit on renewals (EC 2008). 
   
- Table 2 about here - 
 
The OECD EPL index is composed of two subindicators: the regulation of fixed-term 
contracts inside and outside TWAs. Some of the reregulation that shows up in figures 1 and 2 
above has to do with the regulation of fixed-term contracts inside TWAs which is not covered 
by the EC directive (1999/70/EC). In the EMEs, TWAs were legalised only in 2004 (Coe et 
al.  2006).  Hence,  this  produces  a  strong  reregulatory  effect  in  the  index.  In  Poland,  for 
example, the index jumps from 0.5 to 2.5. The distinction between the regulation of fixed-
term con-tracts inside and outside TWAs will be discussed further below, but first the last 
reform type, across-the-board concurrent deregulation will be presented.   13
 
Across-the-board concurrent deregulation 
There have been three instances where the legislation on regular and temporary employment 
has been concurrently deregulated: in Spain 1994 and in Slovakia 2003. The focus here will 
be  on  Slovakia.  The  reform  of  the  regulation  of  temporary  work  in  Spain  went  in  both 
directions: fixed-term contracts inside TWAs were de-regulated while fixed-term contracts 
outside TWAs were reregulated.  
In Slovakia, the broad bipartisan coalition which took over in the midst of economic 
crisis in 1998 began discussions over a reform of the employment protection legislation. The 
result was first a reform of the labour code initiated by the left-wing government party which 
strengthened the regulation of working hours, hiring and firing procedures and increased the 
role of unions, who were given a de facto veto in dismissal procedures. With regard to fixed-
term contracts the maximum cumulated duration was set to three years. However, before it 
was introduced in March 2002 an amendment was negotiated between the coalition parties 
which relaxed the provisions on working hours while retaining unions’ veto power (Jurajda 
and Mathernová 2004). 
  The conservatives took over in the 2002 elections and quickly pushed through a reform 
of the labour code, introduced in May 2003, affecting both regular and temporary employ-
ment.  Regarding  the  regulation  of  temporary  work,  restrictions  on  the  use  of  fixed-term 
contracts were relaxed and restrictions on the renewal of fixed-term contracts were removed 
(outside  TWAs).  Regarding  regular  work,  unions  lost  their  veto,  the  notice  period  for 
dismissals were shortened and severance payments were limited to two/three months (Jurajda 
and Mathernová 2004).  
  According to Jurajda and Mathernová (2004), the concurrent deregulation of both re-
gular and temporary employment was made possible by the combination of strong reform 
pressure (unemployment was at about 18 per cent, much higher than in the other EMEs), by 
the popular support for the conservative government, manifested in the 2002 elections, and 
by the weak position of unions in Slovakia in comparison with the other EMEs.  
 
3. The regulation of fixed-term contracts inside and outside TWAs 
In the reforms described above, there have been legislative changes both with regard to fixed-
term contracts concluded inside and outside TWAs. In this last section, we will move away 
from looking at different reform types, in which the regulation of temporary employment 
combines  both  of  these  two  types  of  fixed-term  contracts.  Instead,  we  put  the  focus  on   14
bringing out the variation that exists between the current regulation on fixed-term contracts 
applicable to a situation when an individual is hired directly by an employer and a situation 
when he-/she is employed by a TWA.
15 The OECD EPL index makes include this distinction 
in their subindicators to the regulation of temporary employment (see note 2). Figures 3 and 4 
show the development in regulation over time. 
 
- Figure 3 and 4 about here - 
 
The distinction between the regulation of fixed-term contracts concluded inside and 
outside TWAs is interesting to note in itself as it is rarely done in the literature. The distinc-
tion is especially important to make if the stringency of the regulation differs between the two 
areas, i.e. if TWAs face more or less regulations relative to other employers. Antoni and Jahn 
(2009) has shown that the deregulation of  fixed-term contracts inside TWAs in Germany has 
had an effect on the job tenure in the temporary employment sector. The same reforms with 
regard to  fixed-term contracts outside TWAs might have had  a different effect  since  the 
regulations are stricter in this area.  
The focus in the survey of national legislation, presented in table 3, has been limited to 
maximum cumulated duration. The other two possible indicators included in the document-
tation of the LABREF database are restrictions on use and requirements of equal treatment. 
However, the motivation for not including those indicators is, first, that most of the variation 
seems to be found in relation to maximum duration, and second, that the other two indicators 
often are more dependent on court decisions in its implementation and are thus liable to be 
less valid indicators of actual regulation. However, also maximum duration can be subject to 
court rulings and the information presented below should therefore be read critically. 
The  table  below  shows  that  the  stringency  of  regulation  with  regard  to  maximum 
cumulated duration of fixed-term contracts differs in the majority of countries between fixed-
term contracts concluded  inside and outside TWAs. Overall, fixed-term contracts  outside 
TWAs seem to be more strictly regulated than fixed-term contracts inside TWAs. One key 
explanation for this variation is the fact that the EC directive on fixed-term work only applies 
to  fixed-term  contracts  outside  TWAs.  The  EC  directive  on  temporary  agency  work 
(2008/104/EC), which deals with fixed-term contracts concluded inside TWAs is a separate 
regulative instrument, which in contrast to the directive on fixed-term work does not address 
the issue of the prevention of the abuse; it “… makes no commitment in favour of the stabili-  15
sation of temporary work relationships provided through successive contracts.” (Countouris 
and Horton 2009, 338)  
 
- Table 3 about here - 
 
  An important qualification to the argument above is that fixed-term contracts outside 
TWAs are much more important in terms of numbers; fixed-term contracts inside TWAs 
range between 1.4 and 2.3 per cent of total employment in the EU-15 in 1999 (Storrie 2002). 
In comparison, the total share of fixed-term contracts in the EU-15 was in 2000 about 15 per 
cent (Eurostat). Nonetheless, temporary agency work has grown over the last decade up until 
the economic crisis in 2008. Ciett (2011), the International Confederation of Private Employ-
ment Agencies, has shown that the market penetration
16 in Europe of TWAs has increased 
from 1.1 per cent in 1998 to 2 per cent in 2007. The countries with the highest penetration of 
TWAs in Europe are: United Kingdom (3.6 %), Netherlands (2.9 %), Germany (2.9 %), Bel-
gium (1.7 %), France (1.6 %), and Austria (1.4 %).   
 
4. Conclusion 
The ambition in the article has been to make sense of the variation that exists in labour 
market reform by, first, identifying the universe of reform types and to analyse the regulatory 
and political context in which the reforms were introduced, and second, by highlighting the 
variation that exists within the regulation of temporary work between contracts concluded 
inside and outside TWAs.  
Looking back on labour market reforms from the mid-1980s to the present, there are 
first some broad trends that warrant our interest. In CMEs/MMEs, which have had a higher 
initial level of regulation, the main trend has been two-tier reforms. In contrast, in LMEs and 
in EMEs, which shared low initial levels of regulation for temporary work, there has been a 
reregulation of such work. While the former trend has been driven by domestic factors, i.e. 
strong reform pressure emanating from high levels of unemployment, the latter trend is pri-
marily the result of the transposition of EC directives.  
  These two broad trends make out two of the reform types presented in the article. To 
capture the underlying variation, we have identified a set of additional reform types (see table 
1). First, a distinction can be made between two-tier reforms in countries with high or low 
levels of employment protection legislation for regular work. Second, in Spain we have seen 
a reregulation which was based on political reform pressure emanating from the very high   16
levels of temporary employment. Third, in Slovakia we have seen an example of a single 
reform which simultaneously deregulated both temporary and regular work. Finally, in Fin-
land and Austria there has been a deregulation of only the employment protection legislation 
for regular workers. 
Analytically, after having mapped the variation in labour market reform, it is possible 
to draw some tentative conclusions about the effects of the regulatory and political context in 
which the reforms have been made. First, looking at the regulatory context the main trend is 
one of deregulation. The regulation of temporary work has been made less strict in most 
countries apart from those which had very low levels of initial regulation, the LMEs and the 
EMEs. A case in point is the lack of regulation of TWAs in the EMEs. The employment 
protection legislation for regular work has, on the other hand, remained unreformed in most 
countries.  Interestingly,  this  holds  true for  both  high-  and  some  low-regulation  countries 
(Italy, Belgium and Denmark, but not Ireland and the UK). This finding challenges the view 
that the deregulation of temporary work only takes place in countries with high regulation of 
regular work. The two countries where we can see a deregulation of the employment pro-
tection legislation for  regular work, Austria and  Finland, both  share initial low levels of 
regulation of temporary work. A tentative interpretation could be that the combination of high 
levels of regulation of regular work and low levels of regulation of temporary work leads to 
pressure to deregulate the legislation on regular work.  
The fact that the employment protection legislation for regular work has remained un-
reformed throughout the period in both high- and some low-regulation countries suggests the 
importance of political explanations. In the literature on two-tier reforms, explanations have 
focused on the vote-maximising strategies of political parties and unions’ defence of their 
organisational interest. The across-the-board reform in Slovakia has been suggested to result 
from a combination of strong reform pressure, a radical government and weak unions. The 
reform  of  the  regulation  of  temporary  work  can  be  explained  by  a  number  of  factors. 
Deregulation is often a result of strong national reform pressure resulting from high levels of 
(youth) unemployment. In Spain, in contrast, national reform pressure from very high levels 
of temporary employment spurred a reregulation of temporary work. In the LMEs and the 
EMEs, reregulation has either been a result of the transposition of EC directives into national 
legislation or of the legalisation of TWAs. 
  In the last part, the regulation of temporary work was disaggregated into two categories, 
fixed-term contracts concluded inside and  fixed-term  contracts concluded outside TWAs. 
This type of variation has seldom been covered in the literature. Taking this variation into   17
account, it is possible to disentangle to what extent the regulation differs between the two 
types of temporary workers and how they are respectively affected by a particular reform.   18
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1. Reform types 
 
  Regulatory context 
 
Political reform pressure  Reforms  Countries 
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*The two EC directives (1999/70/EC); (2008/104/EC) **The reform pressure on the national level varies between countries 
and revolves around the following issues: high levels of unemployment, problems of labour market entry (youth 
unemployment), high levels of temporary employment, and government partisanship *** No distinction is made here 
between fixed-term contracts inside and outside TWAs † This reform type is not presented in detail. In Austria the 
employment protection legislation for regular work was deregulated in 2003; the reform transformed the severance pay 
legislation into a system of individual savings accounts (OECD 2004). In Finland, the deregulation has entailed a gradual 
shortening of the notice period in three reforms in 1991, 1996 and 2001.    23
 
2. Legislation on max. duration of fixed-term contracts (outside TWAs) in EMEs after the EC 
directive on fixed-term work 
 
  Maximum cumulated 
duration  
Maximum renewals  Objective reasons 
extending duration 
Derogation in coll. 
agreements 
Czech Republic†  2 years. Break of >6 
months opens up for a 
new period. 






Allow FTCs to 
exceed 2 years. 
No 
Hungary†  5 years.* Break of >6 
months opens up for a 
new period.  








Poland†  No††   2  Temporary replace-
ment; seasonal work; 
specific work; during 
trial periods. Allow 
for more than 2 
renewals. 
No 
Slovakia†  3 years. Break of >6 
months opens up for a 
new period.  
Unlimited within the 
3 years. 
Replacement of an 
employee; temporary 
increase in workload 
of max. 8 months; 
result-based task. 
Allow FTCs to 
exceed 3 years.  
Yes 
Slovenia†  2 years** Break of >3 
months opens up for a 
new period. 
Unlimited within the 
2 years.  
Managerial staff; non-
citizen; replacement 
of temporarily absent 
worker; elected and 
appointed officials. 
Allow FTCs to 
exceed 2 years. 
Yes, for small firms. 
Negotiated at firm 
level.  
 
Source: EC 2008 http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=706&langId=en&intPageId=199 * With the same employer ** 
For same worker and for the same job. Transitional period: 3 years until 2007 (large firms), 2010 (small firms) † 
Transposition date (all before accession to the EU on 1 May 2004): Czech Republic 1 March 2004; Hungary 1 July 2001 
and 1 July 2003; Poland 14 November 2003; Slovenia 1 January 2003; Slovakia 2003 and 2004. †† N.B. That the Supreme 
Court has ruled in reference to the EC directive that FTCs should not be excessive in length. 
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3. Legislation on maximum duration fixed-term contracts (FTCs) inside and outside TWAs 
 
  FTCs  FTCs (TWA) 
Austria†  According to case law renewal leads to the 
contract being transformed into an opened-ended 
contract unless objective reasons justify the 
renewal of the FTC. 
No limit regarding maximum duration and 
number of renewals if concluded for objective 
reasons. 
Belgium***  Maximum duration is limited to 2 years, or 3 
years with the authorisation of the social and 
labour inspectorate. With objective reasons 
(replacement, temporary increase in workload etc) 
there are no limits to maximum duration. 
Restrictions: replacement of absent workers, 
temporary increases in work load, or exceptional 
work. Duration is respectively: 6-12 months; 18 or 
more if extended by collective agreement; 3 
months.  
Czech Republic  Maximum duration is 2 years.   Maximum duration is 2 years.  
Denmark†  No limit on maximum duration in legislation. 
Collective agreements and court rulings indicate 
that maximum duration is between 2-3 years after 
which notification procedures are required. 
No legislation, but regulation in collective 
agreements. Court rulings suggest 4-5 renewals 
require notification procedures (no information on 
court rulings on maximum duration).  
Finland†  No limits regarding maximum duration, but for 
successive contracts they can be subject to 
examination by the court. 
No limits regarding maximum duration, but for 
successive contracts they can be subject to 
examination by the court.  
France  The cumulated maximum duration is set at 18 
months, but varies between 9 and 24 months 
depending on the reason for its use. FTCs not 
allowed until after 6 months following dismissals 
for economic reasons. 
Maximum duration is set at 18 months, but varies 
between 9 and 24 months depending on the reason 
for its use. Not allowed until after 6 months 
following dismissals for economic reasons. 
Germany  Maximum duration is set at 2 years, and 4 years 
for newly created enterprises during their first 4 
years, and 5 years for workers over 52 years old 
who are unemployed since at least 4 months.  If 
there is an objective reason the contracts can be 
renewed further. 
No limit of maximum duration.  
Greece  The maximum duration is 2 years after which the 
FTC is transformed into an opened-ended 
contract. 
Maximum duration is 8 months with 1 renewal 
(total duration 16 months).  
Hungary  The maximum cumulated duration is 5 years.   No limit on duration.  
Ireland  The maximum cumulated duration is 4 years.  No limit on duration. 
Italy   The maximum cumulated duration is 3 years.  No limit on maximum cumulated  duration. 
However, maximum cumulate duration can be set 
by collective agreements.    
Netherlands  The maximum cumulated duration is 3 years. 
Collective agreements can derogate from national 
legislation. 
After the first year, 8 renewals are allowed, each 
for 3 months. Maximum cumulated duration is 3 
years after which the contract will be transformed 
into an open-ended contract with the agency.  
Poland  No limitations on maximum cumulated duration.  The maximum duration is 1 year. For the 
replacement of absent workers it is 3 years.* 
Portugal***  The maximum cumulated duration is 3 years when 
there is a fixed date of termination and 6 years 
when there is no fixed date of termination. 
No limit on maximum duration.  
Slovakia  Maximum cumulated duration is 3 years. 
However, when there are objective reasons there 
is no limit on duration. 
No limit of maximum duration.  
Slovenia  Maximum cumulated duration is 2 years (3 years 
for SMEs up until 2010) 
Maximum cumulated duration of 1 year. 
Spain  The maximum duration depends on the reason for 
its use. For temporary increase in workload: 6 
months (12 if neg. in collective agreements); for 
other reasons, no limitation, but if the worker has 
been under contract for 24 months within a period 
of 30 months, it is transformed into an opened-
ended contract. Training contracts: max. 2 years 
(3 years by collective agreement); for workers 
with disability: 3 years. For replacement contracts 
for workers close to retirement: 5 years.  
No limit on duration in case of substitution and for 
contract related to a specific task. Contracts for 
temporary increase in workload are limited to 6 
months and contracts covering temporarily a post 
during a selection process are limited to 3 months.  
Sweden**  Maximum duration is 2 years. Collective  Duration decided in collective agreements.    25
agreements can derogate from national legislation.  
United Kingdom  Maximum cumulated duration is 4 years after 
which the contract will be treated as a opened-
ended contract. 
No limitation of maximum duration.  
 
Source: EC DG Ecofin LABREF Database http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/labref/index_en.htm - the in-
formation is based on the adherent documentation outlining national legislation; EC 2006, 2008 * The information in Poland 
has been complemented since the information in the documentation did not match the movement of the OECD EPL index 
with regard to FTCs in TWAs: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2003/08/inbrief/pl0308103n.htm ** Sweden is not in-
cluded  in  the  LABREF  documentation.  Instead  national  sources  have  been  used.  ***  Belgium  and  Portugal also  have 
minimum duration of FTCs: 3 months and 6 months respectively. † N.B. the strong role of the courts in these two countries. 
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1 Regular work refers to open-ended contracts and temporary work to fixed-term contracts. The relevant OECD 
indicators are: EPR_v1 and EPT_v1. With regard to EPT_v1, see note 2 below. EPR_v1 concerns dismissal 
protection for workers in regular employment and is composed of three subindicators: (1) procedural 
inconveniences of individual dismissal of employees on regular contracts (item 1-2); (2) notice and severance 
pay for no-fault individual dismissal (item 3-4); (3) difficulty of dismissal (item 5-8). 
www.oecd.org/employment/protection Accessed 2010-11-12. 
 
2 The relevant OECD subindicators are: TEMPORARY1 and TEMPORARY2_v1. Together they make up the 
indicator EPT_v1. TEMPORARY1 is composed of three items: (1) valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts; 
(2) maximum number of successive fixed-term contracts; (3) maximum cumulated duration of successive fixed-
term contracts. TEMPORARY2 is composed also of three items: (1) types of work for which temporary work 
agency employment is legal; (2) restrictions on number of renewals of temporary work agency contracts; (3) 
maximum cumulated duration of successive temporary work agency contracts. 
www.oecd.org/employment/protection Accessed 2010-11-12.  
 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/labref/index_en.htm Accessed 2010-12-03. 
4 The included countries are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
For national reforms, the article makes use of the OECD EPL-indicators, a new database constructed in co-
operation between Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti and IZA (Not yet published online: http://www.frdb.org), 
features  and  news  articles  from  the  European  Industrial  Relations  Review,  and  secondary  literature.  For 
information on the transposition of the EC directive on fixed-term work (1999/70/EC), the article relies on 
publications  by  the  EU  Commission  EC.  2006.  Commission  Staff  Working  Document.  Report  by  the 
Commission services on the implementation of COUNCIL Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning 
the Framework Agreement on Fixed-term Work concluded byt ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (EU-15), EC. 2008. 
Commission Staff Working Document. National Legislation Transposing Directive 1999/70/EC on Fixed-Term   28
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Work in the EU 10.. For information on regulation regarding FTCs inside and outside TWAs, the article has 
made use of Ecofin’s database LABREF: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/labref/index_en.htm Accessed 2010-12-03. 
5 The use of political-economy types from the Varieties of Capitalism literature is justified since the typology 
includes labour market regulation. 
6 Figure 1 and 3 includes data for the following countries – CME/MMEs: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden; LMEs: Ireland and the UK. 
7 Figure 2 and 4 includes data for four EMEs: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Slovenia is not 
available in the OECD index. 
8 N.B. The regulation of employment protection for regular workers is stronger in the CEEC countries than in 
the LMEs. 
9 While the large majority of reforms are covered by the OECD EPL-index there are a few exceptions: the two 
reforms on temporary employment in France in 1985 and 1986 are not included while the reform concerning 
regular employment is represented in the index. So is also the case with the deregulation of temporary work in 
Italy in 1987. 
10 Art. 18 in the 1970 Workers Statute stipulates that, in firms employing more than 15 employees, any worker 
deemed by the court to have been dismissed without just cause or a valid economic motive has a right to choose 
between monetary compensation (15 months of wage) or re-integration in the previous job, which also entails 
that the employer must pay retroactive wages and social contributions. This provision does not apply to those 
employed in firms with less than 15 employees, where those deemed to have been dismissed without just cause 
or a valid economic motive are only entitled to modest monetary compensation (set by the judge at a level 
between 2.5 and 6 monthly wages, that can be increased up to 10 monthly wages for those with more than 10 
years of firm seniority, and up to 14 for those with more than 20 years of firm seniority), unless the employer 
decides to rehire the worker, thus establishing a new contract, whereby the worker loses his/her previous 
seniority (and no retroactive contributions nor wages are due). 
 
11 The information on the transposition of the EC directive is taken from: EC. 2008. Commission Staff Working 
Document. National Legislation Transposing Directive 1999/70/EC on Fixed-Term Work in the EU 10. For a 
similar study of the EU-15 see: EC. 2006. Commission Staff Working Document. Report by the Commission 
services on the implementation of COUNCIL Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the Framework 
Agreement on Fixed-term Work concluded byt ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (EU-15).  
12 In Western Europe, most countries had legalised temporary work agencies earlier in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Germany, France, UK, Belgium); in the 1980s (Austria, Portugal), and in the 
1990s (Sweden, Spain, Italy). Finland and Greece legalised such agencies in 2001 –  Coe, Neil, Jennifer Johns, 
and Kevin Ward. 2006. Regulating Temporary Staffing: the geographical unevenness of national labour market 
legislation. Working Brief, University of Manchester (18). 
13 In addition, there existed a possibility for employers to by-pass the Labour Code by using a special form of 
task-based contracts, so-called “civil contracts.” These fell under the Civil Code, which contained no provisions 
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